#8 China Scholar Insights: Trump 2.0 Era and South East Asia
ASEAN is a significant force, and there is still a possibility for both China and the U.S. to achieve mutual cooperation and win-win outcomes in the region.
Welcome to the 8th edition of China Scholar Insights!
China Scholar Insights is a feature aiming to provide you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We carefully select commentary and highlight key insights. Questions and feedback can be directed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn.
I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairs+ is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.
Chinese Scholar Insights on Trump 2.0 Era and South East Asia
Background
In recent weeks, the Trump administration has been wielding the tariff stick, introducing the so-called “reciprocal tariff” policy. A wide range of countries—including U.S. allies—are now facing a new wave of steep tariffs. Southeast Asian countries have also become victims of this tariff escalation. Nations such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are reportedly facing tariffs of over 30%.
Since taking office, Trump has opted to inherit the Indo-Pacific strategy initiated under the Biden administration, which aims to shift the focus of U.S. foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific region to compete strategically with China. This new round of blanket tariff hikes follows Trump’s “America First” logic: using tariffs to create leverage in negotiations while also reaping substantial revenue and offsetting the trade deficit.
The impact of Trump’s tariff policy is far-reaching. First, even U.S. allies, like those in Europe, have not been spared, which could weaken the cohesion of the American alliance system. Second, Southeast Asian countries have traditionally leaned on the U.S. for security while relying on China for economic growth. Under mounting tariff pressure from Washington, these countries may begin to adjust their balancing strategies. Lastly, increased tariffs on China are likely to further strain China-U.S. relations, putting Southeast Asia—which sits between the two powers geopolitically—under even greater diplomatic pressure and exposing the region to more complex security and economic challenges.
Summary
Scholars widely believed that Trump’s policies will pose challenges to ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries must prepare to mitigate risks and thereby safeguard national interests. The changes in U.S. foreign policy and China-U.S. relations will compel Southeast Asian states to adjust their economic, political, and security (in the traditional sense) policies. Within ASEAN, U.S. policies may undermine the solidarity among states and even exacerbate the uneven development among them, but there is also reason to be optimistic. Moreover, the pressure exerted by the U.S. on ASEAN countries, particularly in the South China Sea region, could potentially threaten China’s national security, while also offering new opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between China and ASEAN countries. Overall, in the intense global-scale competition between China and the U.S., ASEAN is a significant player. It’s still possible that both China and the U.S. will achieve mutual cooperation and win-win outcomes in the region.
Insights
CHENG Hanping: U.S.-ASEAN Relations and Developments in the Trump 2.0 Era
Uniting ASEAN Against China: The Biden Administration’s Southeast Asia Policy
The Biden administration prioritized the ‘aligned ally’ system in its foreign policy. In its ASEAN strategy, it expanded the ‘minilateral’ mechanism to include ASEAN nations for the first time. For example, Biden’s government upgraded bilateral ties with Vietnam, aiming to destabilize ASEAN’s neutrality or any positive relations with China. Concurrently, it sought to weaken China-ASEAN economic cooperation through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
America First: An outlook of Trump’s Southeast Asia Policy and its impacts
Trump emphasizes interests and transactions that serve U.S. development, firmly prioritizing American interests over those of aligned allies in conflicts. For instance, the facts that Vietnam reaps large gains from U.S.-China trade tensions and that it’s the U.S.’s fourth-largest trade surplus partner are unacceptable to Trump, who is expected to retaliate against Southeast Asian nations via tariffs and forced purchases of U.S. arms or goods. When aligned allies require defense support, Trump adopts a transactional approach, exploiting the “China threat” narrative to demand allies pay more for defense. Moreover, U.S. aid to Southeast Asia is likely to shrink, contrasting sharply with Biden’s policies. Finally, the U.S. withdrawal from international organizations—such as climate and trade agreements critical to some ASEAN states—will disrupt regional stability.
Shifting Political Dynamics and Economic Interests: Southeast Asia Under Pressure
Trump’s idiosyncratic foreign policy will reshape Southeast Asia’s political-economic structure. His staunch support for Israel may sway Islamic nations’ strategic choices, pushing them toward China. Economically, Trump’s proposed tariffs on Southeast Asian imports will slow growth. Some ASEAN states will prioritize appeasing Trump to minimize economic harm: they may adopt stricter policies against Chinese goods and increase U.S. imports to reduce trade surpluses. These adaptations will profoundly alter the region’s geopolitical landscape.
YANG Jiemian: Strategic Thinking and Policy Measures of China and the United States towards Southeast Asia: Review and Prospect
Post-WWII: Containing Communist “Expansion” and Direct Military Intervention
From 1945–1976, U.S. Cold War strategies in Southeast Asia centered on the Domino Theory, which was ideological and military-centric, until Nixon’s withdrawal and the détente in U.S.-China relations marked its failure. The 1977–1988 era saw shifting priorities amid the China-U.S.-Soviet “strategic triangle.” Carter emphasized economic engagement while Reagan expanded security ties. From 1989-2012, the U.S. adopted George H.W. Bush’s “New World Order” approach, Clinton’s “engagement and enlargement,” and George W. Bush’s counter-terrorism focus in sequence. Since 2009, U.S. strategies have increasingly targeted China: Obama’s “Pivot to Asia,” Trump’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” and Biden’s sustained China-centric framework.
Trump’s Return and Southeast Asia: Between Domestic-Driven Strategy and U.S.-China Confrontation
Trump 2.0 prioritizes domestic policies, which will shape its foreign and global strategies. Its Southeast Asia approach will align with broader Indo-Pacific and China Strategy agendas, potentially forcing states in the region to “choose sides” in U.S.-China competition. Also, Trump may deepen ties with the Philippines and Vietnam to contain China. From an economic perspective, the administration could withdraw from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and impose tariffs, threatening Southeast Asia’s economic interests. A U.S.-China economic decoupling would also further destabilize regional trade. Moreover, Trump’s unilateral and confrontational style risks alienating Southeast Asian partners, yielding limited benefits.
China’s Steady Strategy, the US’s Fluctuating Strategy and the Rising ASEAN: Regional Win-Win Cooperation Remains Possible
China’s consistent strategies focus on inclusivity. It promotes the “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind,” which is aligned with the rise of the Global South. China prioritizes ASEAN in its diplomacy through mechanisms like the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By respecting ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN Way, China deepens regional cooperation while advocating Asian values and supporting ASEAN-led frameworks.
The U.S. continues to pursue its core goal of maintaining global hegemony, using military and economic means to strengthen alliances and expand influence, though this approach has weakened trust in Southeast Asia. As ASEAN’s overall strength grows, it plays a more active role in shaping U.S. and China’s regional strategies. Initiatives like the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and economic integration through CAFTA, RCEP, and digital transformation help maintain strategic balance and regional autonomy.
Ultimately, if the U.S. embraces cooperation over confrontation—as the saying goes, “when China and the U.S. cooperate, both benefit”—there remains room for strategic dialogue and win-win collaboration in Southeast Asia.
ZHAI Kun: ASEAN’s Balancing Strategy Amid Trump 2.0: Challenges and Resilience
The Evolution and Core Features of ASEAN’s Balancing Strategy
ASEAN’s grand strategy of balancing major powers has evolved dynamically in the post-Cold War era, aiming to safeguard regional stability and national interests through non-aligned engagement with external powers. This strategy, formalized after 1991, emphasizes ASEAN’s collective agency and institutional frameworks like the “ASEAN+” mechanism, which integrates major powers into a rules-based regional order. A defining element is the concept of “ASEAN centrality,” established in 2007, which positions the bloc as a pivotal driver of regional cooperation. This status has been challenged by shifting U.S. policies, particularly Trump’s “transactionalism,” but remains resilient due to ASEAN’s ability to reconcile divergent interests.
Trump 2.0’s Multidimensional Impact on ASEAN’s Strategy
Trump 2.0 poses four key challenges. First, it undermines ASEAN’s unity by leveraging bilateral alliances (e.g., U.S.-Philippines, U.S.-Thailand) and imposing trade tariffs, which disrupt regional supply chains and heighten economic vulnerabilities. Second, it weakens ASEAN’s institutional coherence by sidelining the bloc’s integration efforts, such as the ASEAN Community, and prioritizing exclusionary frameworks like AUKUS. Third, Trump’s revised “Indo-Pacific Strategy” risks diluting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which emphasizes inclusivity and avoids great-power rivalry. Finally, escalating U.S.-China competition compels ASEAN to navigate tighter strategic constraints, as economic reliance on China clashes with security ties to the U.S..
Adaptive Strategies for ASEAN’s Resilience: Regional Unity, selective alignment and model construction
To mitigate these risks, ASEAN will likely adopt four pragmatic approaches. First, it will strengthen “ASEAN centrality” through institutional innovation, such as accelerating the AOIP and promoting multilateral dialogues. Second, it will pursue “selective alignment,” calibrating engagement with major powers to maximize economic benefits while minimizing security risks. Third, ASEAN will enhance regional economic integration, leveraging supply chain diversification and digital cooperation to reduce dependency on external powers. Lastly, it will advocate for “normative leadership,” framing its strategy as a model for inclusive governance and sustainable development, thereby appealing to nations in the global south.
These strategies reflect ASEAN’s historical resilience in balancing competing interests, ensuring its enduring relevance as a critical actor in shaping the Indo-Pacific order. ASEAN’s balancing strategy holds significant strategic importance, contributing to regional stability by preventing direct great-power conflict and fostering a decentralized global order. For China, supporting ASEAN centrality aligns with its goal of inclusive regional cooperation, while for the U.S., engaging ASEAN constructively could mitigate the risks of unchecked competition. In an era of geopolitical flux, ASEAN’s role as a stabilizing force remains indispensable.
ZHU Feng: “Trump 2.0 Era” U.S. Policy in the South China Sea: Trends and Responses
In “The Trump 2.0 Era”, the U.S. will not reduce its military and diplomatic involvement in the South China Sea but will instead continue to undermine China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, obstruct its efforts to maintain peace and stability, and even promote a “New Cold War” dynamic in the region.
U.S. Interventionist Policies in the South China Sea Will Intensify During Trump’s Second Term
The U.S. will strengthen military deterrence around the South China Sea. Meanwhile, it will continue to promote the “China Threat” narrative, inciting and encouraging neighboring countries to maintain strategic vigilance or even hostility toward China, while using international law and multilateral platforms to impose legal constraints and international pressure on China.
Moreover, the U.S. will support claimant countries in leveraging the “South China Sea Arbitration Ruling” to challenge China. Specifically, it will encourage the Philippines to confront and engage in standoffs with China through various means, and continue to weaponize economic sanctions as part of its intervention in the South China Sea issue.
“The Trump 2.0 Era” Presents an Opportunity for Continued High-Level Dialogue and Communication between China and the US.
Trump’s second term will likely follow a more extreme unilateralist, protectionist, and America-first approach, disrupting international rules and the global order. This may provide a strategic opportunity for China and ASEAN countries to advance negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea and establish new rules for cooperation and peace in the region.
The U.S. government’s efforts to reduce import dependency, increase industrial investment, and advance reindustrialization will require restructuring economic interactions between the US, China, and ASEAN countries. This will, in turn, influence the trajectory of U.S. policy in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, Trump’s lack of enthusiasm for economic aid and his demands for higher defense spending from allies may weaken the substantive progress of trilateral cooperation between the US, Japan, and the Philippines.
China’s Response: Deepening Friendly Cooperation with ASEAN Countries While Firmly Safeguarding Its Core National Interests in the South China Sea
China should enhance military defense capabilities and increase military deployments in the South China Sea. At the same time, China should strengthen cooperation within the RCEP framework. It should promote the implementation of version 3.0 of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). Additionally, China should expand collaboration with ASEAN countries in marine ecological protection and energy resource development. Meanwhile, China could propose and advocate a Chinese solution to global ocean governance and peace, enhancing China’s image as a responsible major power.
U.S.-China communication should be strengthened by improving maritime and aerial communication mechanisms and expanding military communication at the theater command level to effectively prevent the escalation of military conflicts caused by unexpected incidents.
Brian Wong: Three Critical Challenges for ASEAN in the Trump 2.0 Era
Trump’s Strategies in Southeast Asia Have Three Core features:
Economic Protectionism and Trade Inequalities
The Trump administration will likely emphasize economic protectionism, driven by concerns over trade imbalances. Tariffs, Trump’s preferred protectionist policy, could be reintroduced or expanded, particularly targeting key partners in Southeast Asia. Supply chain diversification away from China toward ASEAN nations may continue, but such structural adjustments require time. In the short term, ASEAN economies may struggle with trade barriers or disruptions, exposing them to significant vulnerabilities.
Reduced Security Commitment and Increased Burden-Sharing Demands
The Trump administration is expected to scale back U.S. security and military influence in the region, due to insufficient allied contributions to collective defense. However, the South China Sea will likely remain a central point of strategic contention, given its role in countering China’s maritime expansion. In this context, ASEAN countries should expect more demands and increased pressure from Washington to enhance their defense capabilities.
Agreements with Non-Democratic Regimes
The Trump administration may prioritize transactional relationships with authoritarian or non-democratic regimes, particularly where such engagements align with U.S. commercial interests. These agreements are likely to focus on expanding access for American companies, especially in sectors such as fossil fuels and mineral mining, which are closely aligned with the Republican political base. As a result, U.S. policy may overlook local renewable energy initiatives and broader environmental commitments.
The Three Main Challenges for ASEAN under the Trump Administration
Potential Reduction in U.S. Military Presence
The Philippines is expected to remain a key component of Trump’s regional strategy, specifically in countering China’s control of the first island chain. But the administration’s broader strategic approach to the South China Sea remains uncertain. Given China’s substantial military presence in the region, the extent to which the Trump team can formulate a coherent and effective strategy is unclear.
Downstream impacts of the U.S. Protectionism
Accelerated supply chain restructuring may benefit strong ASEAN economies with a labor supply or resilient capital in strategic industries. However, ASEAN could also suffer from tariffs, prompting manufacturers to relocate to larger ASEAN economies with lower production costs and greater manufacturing capacity, leaving behind smaller economies that are vulnerable to emerging protectionism.
Escalating Tensions in the Taiwan Strait
The notion that ASEAN could remain unaffected by a Taiwan Strait crisis is unrealistic. As Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted in 2023, the tension in the Taiwan Strait is the “most dangerous flashpoint” in U.S.-China competition. Under Trump, U.S. policy toward the region may become more unpredictable, further complicating ASEAN’s efforts to maintain neutrality and regional stability. ASEAN countries must prepare for worst-case scenarios while striving for favorable outcomes.
Conclusion
In the Trump 2.0 Era, U.S. policy towards ASEAN clearly reflects Trump’s diplomatic style of putting American interests first as well as his transactionalism. The U.S is likely to exert pressure on Southeast Asian countries militarily, economically, and politically, and may even force ASEAN nations to choose between China and the U.S. However, Southeast Asian countries also possess resilience in dealing with changing circumstances and will actively adopt various countermeasures. They will thereby influence the policies of China and the U.S. in the region as well as the peace and stability of the region, forming complex and dynamic relations. It’s important for China to promote dialogue with ASEAN countries and participate in establishing stable regional cooperation mechanisms.
Writers and Editors for Today’s Newsletter:
Writers：WANG Jiaying, BAI Xuhan, HU Lingzhi, GAO Liangyu, and HNIN Lei Lei Wai
Editors：SUN Chenghao, ZHANG Xueyu and Hannah Shirley