Prospects for the EU’s Strategic Autonomy: The Increasing Imbalance in US–Europe Relations by ZHANG Jian
Where the European Union will go will largely depend on the direction and intensity of policy adjustments during Trump’s second term.
Welcome to the 27th edition of our weekly newsletter! I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).
ChinAffairs+ is a weekly newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn
Today, we have selected an article written by ZHANG Jian, which focuses on the prospects for the EU’s Strategic Autonomy.
Summary
Trump’s victory in November 2024 once again had a strong impact on the European Union. However, unlike when Trump won the election for the first time in 2016, there have been some disturbing development trends in US–Europe relations. The imbalance in relations between the US and Europe has become even more pronounced. Whether in important fields such as the economy, finance, science and technology, or the military, the gap between the European Union and the United States is widening.
Meanwhile, Europe’s dependence on the United States is also increasing. Especially since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, it has formed an all-round dependence on the United States in terms of security, energy, markets, as well as capital and technology. The increasing imbalance in US–Europe relations has triggered anxiety in Europe, including concerns that Europe might become a “vassal” of the United States.
During Trump’s second term, Europe may be more inclined to cater to the United States and submit to its demands more often. However, under internal and external pressures, it may also accelerate the process of promoting strategic autonomy. Where the European Union will go will largely depend on the direction and intensity of policy adjustments during Trump’s second term.
Why It Matters
During the first term of the Trump administration, the U.S. adopted an adversarial stance towards the EU, resulting in a deterioration of bilateral relations. The concept of strategic autonomy, advocated by France, has gained mounting support within the EU. However, after the Biden administration came to power, relations between Europe and the U.S. improved, and the urgency of the EU’s strategic autonomy declined. In particular, following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the importance of the U.S. to the EU has become more prominent. The concept of strategic autonomy is no longer seen as entirely appropriate by many EU member states.
After Trump’s return, though, he announced the imposition of tariffs on allied countries, including those in Europe, which is expected to increase economic and trade frictions between Europe and the United States. Additionally, Trump’s “overhead diplomacy” in addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Vice President Vance’s preachy attitude towards European issues such as democracy and freedom of speech at the Munich Security Conference have fostered feelings of disappointment towards the U.S. among European strategists.
The U.S.’s neglect of Europe’s major issues, pressure through tariffs, reduction in shared defense responsibilities, and derogatory remarks about transatlantic relations may accelerate Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. In the face of an increasingly assertive US, European countries might also need to reassess their relations with other states.
Key Points
A widening disparity in the power of the EU and the U.S.
Economic Status
In the economic field, the EU has been an opponent and negotiating partner with almost the same strength as the U.S. for a long time. But multiple crises, such as the EU sovereign debt crisis, the Ukrainian crisis, the refugee crisis, and the Brexit crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, have made the economic gap between the EU and the U.S. continue to widen. The structural reasons, such as the demographic structure, net energy export, and the fiscal policy space, are difficult to change in a short period of time, and may be more disadvantageous to the EU. The fiscal deficits have limited The EU’s investment in science and technology, which has had a notable impact on the difference in labor productivity between them, and will enlarge advantages of the U.S.
In contrast to the U.S., which has the capacity to sell substantial quantities of arms and energy, the Ukraine crisis has exerted a significant impact on the EU economy. The losses of the Russian market and the decline in affordable Russian energy have resulted in a significant challenge for the EU manufacturing industry, especially for Germany. Following Trump’s return to power, there is a possibility that he may pursue more radical trade policies, such as the implementation of tariffs on the EU and the disruption of the global trade order. These actions would have a greater impact on the EU, which is more dependent on exports.
Financial Capacity
Since the outbreak of the European debt crisis in 2010, from the perspective of reserve currency and international trade, the euro’s international status relative to the U.S. dollar has continued to decline. This phenomenon is intricately linked to the structural challenges faced by the eurozone, such as the liquidity of high-quality euro bonds, the sluggish eurozone economy and the EU’s foreign policy. These structural issues are likely to persist and may even intensify, which could have adverse consequences for the international position of the euro in the long term.
Technological Development
The total market capitalization of the seven largest technology companies in the U.S. is 20 times the total market capitalization of the seven largest companies in Europe. The digital market in Europe is also dominated by American high-tech companies, as Europe may not have the capacity to support alternative companies. There are many reasons for the EU’s technological backwardness, including insufficient investment, extensive regulation, internal market segmentation, and the US’s influence on European high-tech.
Military Strength
After the Cold War, the U.S., as a hegemonic country, maintained and even increased its military investment. In contrast, Europe made significant cuts to its defense spending, reducing the number of heavy weapons and troops. Since the Crimean crisis in 2014, although EU countries have begun to increase their defense spending, the increase is far less than that of the U.S.
The EU faces significant challenges in achieving unified defense procurement among its member state, the formation of a military–industrial complex comparable to that of the U.S., and a substantial increase in the defense budget despite economic difficulties. A significant portion of the defense procurement funds of EU countries is allocated to the U.S. This dynamic, if sustained, will contribute to mitigate competitiveness of EU military–industrial enterprises. This scenario could potentially lead to an expansion in the military gap between Europe and the United States.
The increasing overall reliance of Europe on the U.S.
Security Dependence
The most imbalanced aspect of the relationship between Europe and the U.S. has been security for a long time. The NATO has been a primary instrument through which the U.S. has been able to exert its influence over European security and foreign policy. Even during the period when Europe had the strongest sense of autonomy and the least security threats, the U.S. still maintained a substantial military presence in the region. In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, Europe has experienced a notable escalation in feelings of insecurity, prompting a resurgence of the US’s prominent role. Regarding the Ukrainian crisis, all key decisions are made in Washington, based on a thorough assessment of U.S. interests rather than those of the EU, such as the question of whether Ukraine can become a NATO member.
Energy Dependence
Europe is the world’s major energy consumer, mainly rely on imports, especially in terms of natural gas. However, the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis forced European countries to complete energy de-Russification in a short period of time. Also, it was an opportunity for the U.S. natural gas industry to occupy the European market. Ultimately, Europe has freed itself from energy dependence on Russia at a high economic cost, but at the same time has become more dependent on the U.S., which is perceived as a more reliable energy source by Europe.
Market Dependence
In recent years, especially since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Europe’s dependence on the U.S. market has increased significantly, and will continue to be highlighted. On the one hand, it is difficult for relations between Europe and Russia to improve in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, due to the high tariffs and reshoring, nearshoring, and friendly shore policies (回岸、近岸、友岸政策) of the U.S., it is more difficult for Chinese goods to enter the U.S. market, and the EU will to a certain extent gain more opportunities to export to the U.S. In addition, the EU is promoting a “de-risking” strategy, discouraging EU companies’ exports to China. However, Europe’s increased dependence on the U.S. has also increased its vulnerability. If Trump fulfills his campaign promises, he will impose tariffs on EU products, especially German products, during his second term, forcing the EU to make major concessions.
The crisis for the EU during Trump’s new term
Possible Vassalization
The expanding disparity and imbalance in power between Europe and the U.S. has caused anxiety in Europe. One possibility is that Europe will succumb to the U.S’ demands, further lose its autonomy and independence, and eventually become the “vassal”. The EU is in a more disadvantageous position than when Trump was elected in 2016, and has high expectations for Trump’s second term. By emphasizing the benefits and importance of the transatlantic alliance to the U.S., Europe prepares to demonstrate goodwill towards the incoming Trump administration. However, this could potentially accelerate the EU’s shift towards a state of “vassalization”.
First, Europe is experiencing a period of weakness, marked by an absence of effective leadership. The three-party coalition government in Germany has disbanded, no longer serving as the primary driver of the EU economy and the stabilizing force in politics. With substantial debt, deficit levels and sluggish growth, if a trade war were to break out between Europe and the U.S., the EU economy will face breakdown. The EU also has to deal with the Ukraine crisis and the conflict in the Middle East. These two conflicts have not only caused Europe to face economic challenges but also led to social division, political fragmentation, and radicalization.
Second, the disparity between Europe and the US has undergone further expansion. This situation leads to an exacerbation of Europe’s comprehensive reliance on the United States. In terms of global order, if the U.S. withdraws from relevant international agreements, undermines international institutions and international rules, the “rules-based international order” cherished by the EU will become even more hypocritical. Consequently, Europe has been compelled to play a more active role in the U.S’ global strategy, and it takes more courage than ever to reject the U.S’ demands.
Third, the influence of countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are extremely pro-American has increased. Poland and the Baltic countries, as well as Nordic countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, prioritize NATO over the EU and are more inclined to align with the U.S. rather than pursue a European path. It is easier for the U.S. to divide and rule Europe by influencing these countries, which could hinder Europe’s pursuit of autonomy.
Fourth, the international geopolitical landscape has undergone significant changes. The divide between the Western world and the Global South has widened, the new Cold War and camp confrontation have intensified, Europe has become more isolated in the global context, and it has become more challenging to deviate from the US’ sphere of influence.
Forced autonomy
There is another possibility. Europe realizes that the US is unreliable and selfish and recognizes the necessity and urgency of achieving strategic autonomy. The Biden administration has adopted a policy of conciliation toward the EU, and the EU has appeared satisfied to adopt a passive role in the relationship. In the past four years, the EU’s strategic autonomy construction has undergone a period of stagnation.
However, the concepts of strategic autonomy and European sovereignty were extensively discussed within the EU during Trump’s first term. A series of measures in the field of defense, trade and diplomacy were implemented in Europe. Facing Trump’s second term, President Macron once again called the construction of strategic autonomy on the agenda again. It is evident that the U.S. will become increasingly unreliable for Europe in the future. Trump’s reelection has allowed Europe to clearly recognize the tremendous changes that have taken place in the US economy, society, and politics. Trump’s success is not a special case or a temporary phenomenon but represents a long-term trend. His ongoing support for the “MAGA” (Make America Great Again) movement is likely to contribute to these ongoing changes.
Middle ground
It is important to note that both of these possibilities exist, but the third option, which is the middle ground between the two, is more likely to occur. The EU is both dependent on the U.S. and promote strategic autonomy. The current transatlantic relationship is a product of the past, and the future will bring new dynamics.
As the world’s second largest economy, it is difficult for the EU to become a complete vassal of the U.S. With unprecedented pressure, European countries will prioritize the promotion of integration, the consolidation of unity and cooperation, the cultivation of strategic independence, and the establishment of a distinctive international role that differs from that of the U.S. in the domains of security, technology, finance, and foreign policy. However, in the foreseeable future, the EU is unlikely to truly achieve strategic autonomy. Not only because of the opposition and threats form the U.S., but also anti-integration and contradictions within the EU. What’s more, despite the EU’s potential consensus on promoting strategic autonomy, financial constraints may hinder its ability to allocate sufficient funds for necessary investments.
Conclusion
In the future, the EU will strive to improve its strategic autonomy and avoid becoming a vassal of the U.S. But at the same time, as long as it does not cause serious damage to the EU’s interests, it will try its best to accommodate and cater to the U.S. Therefore, the EU’s policy toward the U.S. will be volatile and contradictory in the future. The EU’s strategic autonomy process will largely depend on the direction and intensity of Trump’s policies during his second term.
About the Author
Zhang Jian张健：Dr. Zhang Jian, Research Professor, is Vice President of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). He got his Ph.D. in History from Wuhan University in 2003 and has become a researcher at CICIR since then. His research mainly focuses on European integration, EU’s external relations, the EU-US relationship and Sino-EU relationship. He is a regular contributor to academic journals such as Contemporary International Relations as well as national newspapers and magazines like People's Daily and Outlook Weekly etc. He is fluent in English.
About the Publication
The Chinese Version of this article is published in Contemporary International Relations(《现代国际关系》). It is a journal sponsored by China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), founded in 1981. This journal is a monthly publication published on the 20th of each month, mainly featuring the latest research results of Chinese and foreign experts and scholars on international strategic issues, international relations theory, world politics, diplomacy, economy, military, and major hot topics.
