The 2024 Election and the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan by Zhong Houtao
Only by abandoning the illusion of “relying on external forces to seek independence” can the Taiwan authorities create new opportunities for Taiwan's development.
Welcome to the 20th edition of our weekly newsletter! ChinAffairs+ is a weekly newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu. I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall semester 2024).
I recently published an article on China-US Focus, mainly analyzing Trump’s decision-making style in his second term and the trajectory of China-US relations: https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/trumps-decision-making-style-and-china-relations
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn
Today, we have selected an article written by Zhong Houtao, which focuses on the 2024 Election and the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan.
Summary
After Trump’s victory in the US 2024 election, the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) authorities face multiple security concerns. These include the potential decline in Taiwan’s instrumental value due to Trump’s “Pen tip theory”, , the risk of strategic overdraft as Trump might demand protection fees from Taiwan, and the possibility of abandonment amid brinkmanship crises stemming from Trump’s transactional realism.
To mitigate these risks, the DPP has sought to align more closely with Trump by increasing U.S. arms purchases, expanding imports, and supporting his manufacturing reshoring agenda to alleviate U.S. strategic doubts. However, this pro-U.S. stance presents structural challenges, such as contradictions between Trump’s anti-globalization policies and Taiwan’s export-driven economy, as well as the polarization between the DPP’s “pro-U.S.” stance and domestic “skepticism of the U.S.” sentiment. Moving forward, only by abandoning its reliance on external forces for independence can Taiwan chart a new path for sustainable development.
Why It Matters
After the 2024 US election, it will be important to observe U.S.-Taiwan relations due to a potential shift in U.S. foreign policy, which could affect Taiwan’s security posture, economy development and cross-strait relations. A change in leadership could alter U.S. support for Taiwan, affecting Chinese Taiwan’s strategy in dealing with Chinese mainland and broader geopolitical dynamics, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
Some Chinese and American scholars believe that the Taiwan question will be a potential flashpoint in future China-U.S. relations. Both countries are currently paying close attention to the possible trajectory of the Taiwan question, emphasizing the importance of open communication and risk management. At the same time, they aim to understand each other’s stance on the Taiwan question to avoid misjudgments.
However, the risk surrounding the Taiwan question remains. Although some analysts believe that Trump is not particularly focused on the Taiwan question, more Chinese scholars argue that Trump’s advisory team may seek to adjust the U.S. policy toward Taiwan. If Trump believes that such an approach would help apply pressure on Chinese mainland, he may allow his team to implement a more hardline policy.
Key Points
Taiwan may confront more challenges during Trump 2.0
The U.S. presidential election has concluded, with Donald Trump securing re-election. The shift in political leadership in the United States has brought about changes in its policy toward Taiwan. Notably, the 2024 Republican Party platform makes no mention of Taiwan, signaling a potential decline in emphasis on the island. This shift has raised concerns within DPP, which fears that Trump's extreme positions may lead to greater challenges for Taiwan.
Taiwan: Is the unsinkable aircraft carrier about to retire?
The Biden administration has placed great emphasis on developing relations with Taiwan over the past few years. After Trump took office, the Republican Party gradually took control of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. Trump’s transactional mindset is strong, which will result in Taiwan no longer being of high value to the United States. If Trump continues to adhere to transactional thinking, Taiwan’s position in the U.S. strategy will plummet, with its remaining “residual value” at serious risk. It will gradually shift from being a “strategic asset” to becoming a “strategic liability”.
Trump's Military Spending Demands Could Cripple Taiwan's Economy
After the DPP returned to power in 2016, it abandoned the balanced policy of “pro-U.S. and friendly to mainland China” pursued during Ma Ying-jeou's administration and shifted to an unequivocal pro-U.S. stance. As Taiwan's dependence on the United States continued to increase, it also created an important opportunity for the new U.S. administration to impose higher tariffs on Taiwan.
In recent years, Taiwan’s economic development has been very weak. Excessive military spending will force Taiwan to cut back on investments in technology, culture, and education, leaving them at only a basic level. Over time, this will weaken the Democratic Progressive Party's support among the Taiwanese people. DPP authorities may find themselves in disarray, unable to leverage foreign support to pursue “independence” or rely on exclusive favor from the U.S. in domestic public opinion. Public support for the DPP would decline steadily, making the party’s path to the 2026 “Nine-in-One” elections and the 2028 “Two-in-One” elections even more challenging.
Taiwan May Face the Threat of War on Its Own during Trump’s Presidency
In recent years, the United States has repeatedly released reports assessing China’s military capabilities, claiming that the Chinese military has gradually developed the ability to launch an attack on Taiwan. Many figures in the U.S. strategic community believe that China is planning a military unification of Taiwan, promoting the “mainland’s timeline for attacking Taiwan” and suggesting that a cross-strait war may be inevitable. This has led the U.S. to strengthen its protection of Taiwan during the Biden administration, using Taiwan as a litmus test for American loyalty to its allies and a barometer of stability, aiming to enhance U.S. credibility and stability through defending Taiwan.
Trump, who comes from a business background, follows a transactional thinking approach. After the U.S. government has fully assessed the cost-benefit analysis of defending Taiwan, he may be unwilling to send troops to Taiwan. At the same time, Trump takes pride in the fact that he has not initiated any wars, which suggests that his willingness to intervene in the Taiwan Strait dispute is limited. The U.S. Constitution limits Trump to two terms as president, meaning that towards the end of his term, he may try to “negotiate” with China again using the Taiwan question. In this situation, the DPP would also have to face the political reality.
The DPP is stepping up its Public Relations Efforts with the Trump Team
William Lai’s “Taiwan independence” remarks made the U.S. government even more distrustful of him. After Trump took office, Lai was anxious about the attitude of the United States. Therefore, the DPP set up a special task force to increase public relations with the Trump team and show “Taiwan matters to the United States”.
Step up “Crisis Communications” with the Trump Administration
During the U.S. presidential election period, the DPP reached out to both the Democratic and Republican parties. The Pelosi visit to Taiwan in March 2022 was a move orchestrated by the DPP in exchange for an expensive appearance fee. However, after Trump was elected, significant personnel changes occurred within the U.S. government, and Pelosi would not be heading the Cabinet, leaving the DPP caught off guard. As a result, the DPP had no choice but to continue aggressively engaging with key figures within the Trump administration.
First, Lai was very positive in congratulating Trump on his victory. The DPP has emphasized Taiwan’s ties with the United States in many of its official statements.
Second, Lai has been pursuing a call with Trump, but Trump refused to agree on sensitive issues with him.
Finally, Taiwan wants to assign a senior official to Trump’s inauguration, seeing it as a sign of the closeness of relations between the United States and Taiwan.
Expand Imports to the United States
Taiwan earns a huge trade surplus from the United States, leading Trump to argue that Taiwan has stolen American chip manufacturing. The DPP hopes to actively address Trump’s doubts.
To achieve this, Taiwan Airlines clinched a 4 billion dollar order for passenger jets. Lai supports TSMC’s shift of two-nanometer chip manufacturing to the United States. Meanwhile, Taiwan is expanding imports from the United States and reducing its trade surplus with the United States.
Step up Arms Purchases and build ties with the Deep Government
After the election, the DPP did not avoid military risks, but actively prepared for war. Trump’s total arms sales to Taiwan during his first term were very high, which gave the DPP room to imagine. The DPP is planning large-scale arms purchases and seeking a US security commitment to Taiwan.
The DPP’s move does not help in the Long Run
In the short term, the DPP’s move will help win the trust of the United States. But in the longer term, Taiwan is heading for a more dangerous situation.
Trump’s Anti-globalization is at odds with Taiwan’s Export-oriented Economy
Taiwan has been marginalized in the Asia-Pacific regional economic integration. Public opinion is that Taiwan is unlikely to join the CPTPP. Trump’s greater emphasis on trade protectionism has made it impossible for Taiwan to integrate. With the rise of American isolationism, Taiwan faces more risks.
Taiwan’s Growing U.S. Skepticism
Taiwan faces increasing polarization as its pro-American government contrasts with a public growing skeptical of U.S. motives. U.S. actions, including heavy military sales, are fueling concerns that America is using Taiwan to counter the mainland instead of protecting Taiwan. A 2023 survey showed that only 15.6% of Taiwanese believe the U.S. is genuinely committed to Taiwan’s defense, while 67.5% think it uses Taiwan for its own interests. This divide is expected to deepen, especially with potential shifts in U.S. policy.
Taiwan’s “De-Coupling” Strategy Risks Economic Disconnect with the Chinese mainland
Taiwan’s strategy of “de-coupling from Chinese mainland and integrating with the U.S.” is leading to increasing economic risks, particularly in cross-strait industries. U.S. pressure on companies like TSMC, and a shift in Taiwan’s trade patterns, reflect this trend. By mid-2024, Taiwan’s exports to the U.S. surged, while exports to Chinese mainland declined. U.S. influence has caused Taiwan to reduce investments in Chinese mainland and prioritize American ties, further deepening economic separation. This shift under the Tsai and Lai administrations aligns with U.S. efforts to counter China’s technological rise, accelerating Taiwan’s “economic independence” and fueling tensions across the Taiwan Strait.
Conclusion
Without good relations with Chinese mainland, Taiwan risks becoming subservient to the U.S. policy. If Taiwan balances ties with both the mainland and the U.S., it can secure greater benefits. Ultimately, Taiwan’s long-term strength lies in reunification with Chinese mainland, which would ensure national prosperity and stability.
About the Author
Zhong Houtao is an associate professor at the Department of Culture and Communication, University of International Relations, head of the innovative research team on Taiwan strategic prepositioning and key Issues, and a director of the Law Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of the article is published in Cross-Taiwan Strait Studies(《台海研究》). The magazine is positioned as an academic, policy, innovative and cross-the-Taiwan Straits exchange platform, focusing on structural, deep-seated and regular major issues in the Taiwan issue, focusing on cross-Taiwan Straits relations, Taiwan’s political situation, Taiwan-related international factors, thoughts on the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and policies toward Taiwan.
