The EU’s Perception of Multipolarity and China-EU Multilateral Cooperation by JIN Ling

While China and the EU hold divergent views on multipolarity and multilateralism, they also share a significant degree of consensus.

Welcome to the 29th edition of our weekly newsletter! I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn

Today, we have selected an article written by JIN Ling, which focuses on the stances of the EU and China toward multipolarity.

Edited by ChinAffairs+.

Summary

The European Union’s perception of multipolarity has evolved in tandem with changes in its international status. Following the end of the Cold War, the EU initially sought to strategically shape the trend toward multipolarity. However, in the wake of the global financial crisis and the subsequent decline in its international standing, the EU exhibited strategic anxiety regarding the multipolar trend.

As multiple crises unfolded, the EU began to engage in strategic reflection on multipolarity, gradually accepting the reality of a multipolar international order and striving to establish itself as one of its poles through strategic autonomy. Although the EU’s perception of multipolarity has continually shifted, it consistently encompasses dimensions such as “multipolarity and strategic stability,” “multipolarity and Atlantic relations,” “multipolarity and multilateralism,” and “the EU’s international status.”

These dimensions also form the core of the debates surrounding multipolarity between China and the EU. While China and the EU hold divergent views on multipolarity and multilateralism, they also share a significant degree of consensus. In fact, the discourse systems of both sides on multipolarity embody normative aspirations, including opposition to hegemony and unilateralism, as well as commitments to diversity and equal cooperation. These shared principles serve as the foundation for multilateral cooperation between China and the EU within a multipolar framework.

Why It Matters

After starting his second term, the U.S. President Donald Trump once again announced the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the WHO and other international agreements. Meanwhile, the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s interview with former Fox News host Megyn Kelly where he believed that “eventually you were going to reach back to a point where you had a multipolar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet”.

At the same time, we noticed that the theme of this year’s Munich Security Conference report is “multipolarization”. However, it is evident that Europe's perspective on global multipolarity differs significantly from that of Rubio or the current U.S. administration. For China, analyzing the key considerations within EU’s position on multipolarity and comparing them with China’s position will help bridge the perception gap between China and the EU.

The article we selected, although published before the Munich Security Conference report, also reflects the Chinese academic community’s analysis of Europe’s perspective on multipolarity. Interestingly, when China, the U.S., and Europe all discuss the concept of multipolarity, it is likely that we are not talking about the same thing. Moreover, there are differing views on whether multipolarity will bring stability or chaos.

Key Points

1. Historical Evolution of EU’s perception

• Post-Cold War: EU strategically shaping the trend toward multipolarity

After the Cold War, the discourse on multipolarity within the EU was limited. Its main feature was that the EU, as an important pole, sought to shape the coming multipolarity, without showing overall resistance to multipolarity. After the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2003, disagreements between the US and Europe intensified the EU’s internal debate on multipolarity. French President Chirac advocated for a multipolar world, believing it entails establishing a more robust and equitable international order. This stance is consistent with France’s foreign policy inclination to challenge American leadership. Then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair criticized this perspective, arguing that multipolarity would lead to hostility among competing power centers. He opposed positioning Europe against America. Germany’s position remained between that of France and the UK, refusing to recognize the US as a rival and avoiding distancing itself from France’s multipolarity.

• After the Global Financial Crisis: EU’s Strategic Anxiety Regarding the Multipolar Trend

The 2008 financial crisis exposed the deep vulnerabilities of liberalism and stimulated discussions on multipolarity. While gradually coming to terms with the reality of multipolarity, the EU also grew increasingly uneasy about its uncertain future, shifting from an active role in shaping global dynamics to one marked by anxiety and apprehension. Since the 2009 India-EU joint statements, the term “multilateralism” has replaced “multipolarity”. Under strategic anxiety, the EU’s core goal became “multilateral multipolarity,” even showing a tendency to contrast multipolarity with multilateralism.

• A Series of Crises Drove the EU to Reflect Strategically on Multipolarity

After the Crimea crisis, Trump’s first term, and the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the EU was forced to accept the reality of multipolarity. The EU’s 2016 security strategy marked the beginning of its reflection on multipolarity. In 2024, the term “multipolarity” appeared for the first time in European Council Conclusions, which meant that the EU had reached a shared acceptance of multipolarity at the member state level. With the acceptance of multipolarity and strategic reflection, Europe began seeking strategic autonomy, striving to become a pole in the multipolar world rather than continuing to pursue “multilateral multipolarity.”

2. Key Dimensions of EU’s perception

• Multipolarity and Strategic Stability

Whether multipolarity leads to chaos and disorder is the primary variable influencing the EU’s changing perception of multipolarity. This is because the dominant European view has been shaped by historical experiences and is largely influenced by Kenneth Waltz’s theory of neorealism. The current turmoil in international politics has strengthened the EU’s view of multipolarity as a source of instability and unpredictability, leading it to reject any normative significance for multipolarity.

Multipolarity and Atlantic Relations

The division between “Europeanism” and “Atlanticism” in the foreign policies of member states determines their stances on multipolarity. Europeanists are generally more supportive of multipolarity, while Atlanticists believe it would weaken the transatlantic alliance. Macron has clearly emphasized that the key to the EU becoming a “third pole” is to avoid blindly following the US. However, this policy goal of pursuing strategic independence from the US has yet to gain consensus within Europe.

• Multipolarity and Multilateralism

After setbacks in achieving the goal of “multilateral multipolarity,” the EU has come to believe that the strengthening of multipolarity is the cause of the weakening or failure of multilateralism. Multipolarity has created an international system based on bilateral agreements rather than global rules, fueling dissent and making multilateralism more difficult. However, both Scholz and Macron have not stuck to this Eurocentric model. Instead, they hope to respond to multipolarity through a more inclusive multilateral order.

• The EU’s International Status

EU’s international status is the core of the its evolving perception of multipolarity. Chirac believed that the emerging U.S.-China bipolarity signified the loss of Europe’s strategic independence. Macron’s vision of Europe as a “third pole” also reflects anxieties about Europe’s marginalization. Therefore, European integration is now shifting from “regulating power internally” to “building power externally,” with the goal of enhancing member states’ capacity to engage in global geopolitical competition and strengthening their ability to act independently of external forces.

3. China-EU Relations Under the Context of Multipolarity

• Debates surrounding multipolarity between China and the EU

China’s understanding of multipolarity has always gone beyond the perspective of power politics and includes a normative aspect. China’s perception of a “multipolar world” is accompanied by “economic globalization” and “establishing a new international political and economic order that is fair and rational”. The core of the debates on multipolarity between China and the EU lies in whether multipolarity should be viewed as strategic multipolarity or normative multipolarity, with focuses on three key issues.

（1）Does Multipolarity Necessarily Lead to Conflict?

From the perspective of power politics, the EU believes that China’s advocacy for multipolarity is aimed at seeking regional hegemony and reshaping the international order. However, from the beginning, China’s position on multipolarity has been tied to “promoting democracy in international relations”. This includes the principle that the internal affairs of a country are handled by its own people and that international affairs are handled by all countries through consultation. In 2023, President Xi proposed the idea of building “an equal and orderly multipolar world,” clarifying China’s normative pursuit of multipolarity.

（2）Is the Goal of Multipolarity de-Americanized?

The EU believes that China’s vision of multipolarity aims to build a China-centered, de-Americanized international order. In fact, China’s multipolarity is broadly inclusive and goes beyond the perspective of great powers, incorporating emerging powers and regions, the EU, Africa, the Middle East, the Arab world, and regional organizations such as ASEAN and the African Union. China’s multipolarity does not aim at specific countries but seeks to oppose hegemony and power politics while enhancing the voice of developing countries.

（3）Are Multipolarity and Multilateralism Contradictory?

The EU’s perception of multipolarity and multilateralism has evolved from a vision of “multilateralized multipolarity” to one of “conflict between multipolarity and multilateralism.” From the EU’s perspective, multipolarity is accompanied by conflict because different “poles” struggle to reach a consensus. For China, the pathway to normative multipolarity is through multilateralism. However, the EU views China’s promotion of multipolarity as a challenge to multilateralism.

In fact, the deeper challenges to multilateralism stem from the following aspects. First, the underrepresentation of developing countries in current multilateral organizations undermines the legitimacy of existed organizations. Second, the effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms has long been eroded by unilateralism and hegemony represented by the US. Finally, the lack of both representativeness and effectiveness has led to declining international recognition of multilateral organizations. As a result, multilateralism is facing skepticism from the US and European countries.

• China-EU Cooperation Under a Multipolar Framework

China and the EU hold divergent views on multipolarity and multilateralism but also share a significant degree of consensus. The discourse systems of both sides on multipolarity embody normative aspirations, including opposition to hegemony and unilateralism, as well as commitments to diversity and equal cooperation. Although China-EU relations have experienced ups and downs, strengthening multilateral cooperation has consistently been a strategic consensus. Historically, China and EU have maintained close coordination and cooperation on multilateral issues such as climate action, the Iran nuclear deal, and WTO reform. However, ideological and geopolitical thinking have constrained the development of China-EU relations. Initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offer new opportunities for China-EU multilateral cooperation. But this requires the EU to transcend a perspective of competition and conflict and return to multipolarity and multilateralism with cooperation, diversity, openness and inclusiveness.

Conclusion

The EU’s perception of multipolarity has undergone a transformation — from shaping the trend to exhibiting strategic anxiety and finally to reflecting strategically on the issue. The EU perceives multipolarity through its relationship with strategic stability, Atlantic relations, multilateralism, and the EU’s international status. The debates between China and the EU are rooted in these dimensions. The potential for China and the EU to cooperate multilaterally depends on the EU’s willingness to embrace multipolarity in a way that transcends power politics.

About the Author

JIN Ling金玲: Dr. JIN Ling is a senior research fellow and director of the Department for European Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS). She focuses on EU integration, European foreign policy and China-EU relations.

The Chinese version of this article was published in International Studies（《国际问题研究》）. The journal, which launched in May 1959 by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) affiliated with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is one of China’s earliest academic journals focused on international affairs. Its creation was supported by key Chinese leaders, including Zhang Wentian, who advocated for a platform to publish research on global issues. The journal’s title was personally inscribed by Vice Premier Chen Yi, reflecting the high-level attention it received. After initial publication, International Studies faced interruptions due to economic difficulties but was revived in 1981 as a quarterly and later as a bimonthly journal in 2000. With China’s growing global influence, China International Studies was introduced in 2005 to offer international readers insights into China’s foreign policy. A comprehensive redesign in 2011 further elevated the journal's quality and expanded its influence worldwide.