WANG Junsheng on Divergent China-U.S. Security Order Concepts and the Construction of Asian Security Order
How should China shape Asian security order
Welcome to the 9th edition of our weekly newsletter! Last week, our newsletter shared the debate between Professor John Mearsheimer and Professor Yan Xuetong at Tsinghua, which received widespread attention. We’re also pleased to see that Professor Mearsheimer shared our newsletter. For those interested, you can read the discussion between these two experts from China and the U.S. on bilateral relations and the global order:
YAN Xuetong & John Mearsheimer Conversation: Who Shapes Global Order, and Who Will Win the Competition?
Today’s newsletter based on Professor WANG Junsheng’s article also reflects, in part, the differing perspectives between China and the U.S. on regional and even global security order. Perhaps you may not agree with his perspective, but I have always believed that it’s essential to understand the other side’s views before engaging in a meaningful debate.
ChinAffairs+ is a weekly newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu. I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, and currently a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in the United States.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China's academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn
Summary
The construction of an Asian security order is closely related to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and the perspectives on order held by China and the United States are key factors influencing this construction. Regarding the Asian security order, China has proposed a Global Security Initiative, while the United States advocates for a "rules-based international order". The distinction between the two perspectives lies in the fact that: the U.S. promotes unilateral security, while China advocates for cooperative security; the U.S. pursues hegemonic politics, while China champions Asian consultation; the U.S. aims to promote camp confrontation, while China seeks to build a community with a shared future for Asia. Countries across Asia generally support China’s perspective on regional order and express reservations about the U.S. approach. Only a few, such as Japan, South Korea, and India, align with the U.S. viewpoint on order.
Considering the characteristics of the Asian security environment and drawing on practices from other major powers, China should adhere to the principle of indivisible security in advancing the construction of an Asian security order, ensuring "peace" through enhanced top-level design. It should comprehensively employ both "economic" and "security" measures, while also increase investment in security resources. The approach should be meticulous and progressive, addressing different regions and countries step by step, while balancing the influences of Russia and the United States.
Why it matters
Since the Second World War, an Asian security order has not yet been fully established, with significant negative impacts on regional peace and development. First, without a clear regional framework for conflict resolution, tensions and historical grievances risk escalating into military confrontations and could lead to arms races. Second, the lack of coordinated economic development efforts can hinder regional growth. Third, the absence of a regional security architecture amplifies major power competition within Asia. Additionally, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has exacerbated these challenges, leading some Asian countries to feel anxious, concerned that China might take advantage of this moment for military action that could harm their national interests. Consequently, national and regional security have become more critical priorities than ever before.
As a major power in Asia, China seeks national rejuvenation, which necessitates harmonious relations with neighboring countries. Therefore, establishing an Asian security order is essential to achieving this goal. However, how to navigate the competition for dominance over the regional security order, both with countries within and outside of Asia, remains uncertain. Understanding the differences between China and the U.S. on regional security views, along with the perspectives of other key countries in the region, is essential. Based on this analysis, the author highlights a path forward for constructing a stable Asian security order.
The author's perspective also reflects the mainstream view within Chinese academia. Essentially, these scholars do not believe that China and the U.S. share a common security outlook in Asia. Especially since the U.S. has designated China as a strategic competitor, contradictions between the two countries in regional security are only expected to intensify.
Key Points
The Absence of Asian Security Order and Major Powers Strategic Comptition
The Asian security order is characterized by a stable and secure behavior pattern in the region. However, since World War II, this order has been absent. There are 14 existing multilateral mechanisms in Asia, and only the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization focus on security.
The Consequences of the lack of Asian Security Order
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. leadership in Asian security has expanded, primarily through its alliances, particularly those with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The U.S. applies military pressure on China via initiatives such as the Quad Security Dialogue and the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, while simultaneously aiming to secure economic cooperation and imposing technological and commercial restrictions on China. Ideologically, it fosters value-based opposition and convenes successive Global Democracy Summits. The Asian order has, in large part, become an extension of the Western-led order. However, China has never acknowledged the legitimacy of U.S. leadership in Asian security affairs and rejects the replication of the Western order within the region.
The Probable Future of the Asian Security Order
In shaping past and future security orders, major powers serve as the core driving forces. Both the U.S. and China aim to influence the regional security landscape: the U.S. seeks to curtail China’s influence in Asia by aligning with other regional powers to isolate it, while China focuses on countering U.S. pressure and prioritizing the construction of an independent Asian security order. Regional powers such as Japan and India are generally inclined to take sides in the U.S.-China rivalry, exerting limited independent influence. The outcome of the China-U.S. competition for dominance over Asia’s security order will hinge not only on shifts in their relative power but also on which country’s vision for order proves more compelling to the region.
Differences in the China/U.S. Security Order Perspectives
In terms of the direction of Asian security order, China proposed the Global Security Initiative for the first time in 2022, reiterating the idea and willingness to build a “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable Asian security vision”. This offers a Chinese option for the construction of a Asian and even global security order. In contrast, the U.S. frequently advocates for a “rules-based international order” and “freedom of navigation” in Asia, and often highlights strategic initiatives aimed at jointly maintaining regional order with like-minded countries, particularly relying on "small multilateral mechanisms" to address “Challenge from China”.
Unilateral Security vs. Cooperative Security
After World War II, most countries began to endorse a “rules-based international order”, closely aligned with the liberal international order. This approach aims to reinforce Western liberal dominance and sustain U.S. leadership to ensure unilateral security. In contrast, China’s Global Security Initiative advocates for genuine multilateralism, grounded in the principle of “indivisible security”, which emphasizes cooperative security.
Hegemonic Politics vs. Asian Consulation
The U.S. insists that all countries must obey the UNCLOS, yet seeks to avoid constraints, stigmatizing legitimate claims to maritime rights as "excessive demands". The principle of "freedom of navigation" has prominent impact on Asian security ,especially on the South China Sea issue, where the U.S. openly opposes China by intruding into Chinese territorial waters, with the real purpose of realizing maritime hegemony. In response, China clearly states that "the security of Asia ultimately relies on the people of Asia", upholds the peaceful resolution of disputes with directly involved parties, opposes internationalization of the issue and interference from external forces.
Bloc Confrontation vs. Shared Community
A series of small multilateral mechanisms established by the U.S., despite their rhetoric of freedom, democracy, and human rights, essentially aims to promote bloc confrontation and serve the major power competition. China explicitly opposes group politics, proposing the neighborhood diplomacy principle of “amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness”（亲、诚、惠、容）, pursuing an Aisan community with a shared future. China also shoulder the responsibility in coping with Asian security affairs such as the Korean Peninsula, Afghanistan, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Responses from Asian Countries to the China/U.S. Security Order
The Global Security Initiative has been warmly received by Asian countries that align with China’s perspective on order while expressing skepticism toward the American approach. The regional collaboration advocated by China is anticipated to surpass the group politics promoted by the U.S. and play a dominant role in the establishment of an Asian security order.
Most Asian countries maintain neutrality and question the U.S. view of security order.
Southeast Asia: Due to distrust of the U.S., the potential opportunities brought by China's rise, and the influence of regionalism in Southeast Asia, ASEAN has always played a central role in the development of Asian order, establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum for cooperative security, and unwilling to take sides. The attitude of Southeast Asian countries toward the American view of order is particularly reflected in their stance on small multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia concerns most about the marginalization of ASEAN and arms races; Singapore fears the intensification of China-U.S. competition; Laos and Cambodia remain wary of the pro-U.S. and anti-China implications of the Quad dialogue. Malaysia and Thailand are also skeptical of the Quad.
Other Subregional Countries: Due to the inherent problems in the American view of order (theoretical disconnection, vague order, the powerlessness of a single order) and the declining capability of the U.S. to construct a security order, other subregional countries in Asia also generally harbor doubts about the American perspective. Mongolia in Northeast Asia pursues a neutral stance between China and the U.S. The relationship between Russia and the U.S. has further deteriorated due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, while North Korea and the U.S. remain in a hostile relationship. In South Asia, Pakistan explicitly opposes the Quad. In Central Asia, relevant countries adopt a balanced stance among major powers and react coolly to the U.S. view of security order.
Few countries still support the U.S. view of security order (particularly U.S. allies).
Japan and South Korea not only actively strengthen their strategic coordination with the U.S., but also take on the role of proxies for the U.S. in the Asian region. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines is the most openly supportive country of the Quad, having publicly announced the reopening of four military bases to the U.S. access. The Modi government in India has shifted from a non-alignment policy to a quasi-alliance with the U.S., actively cooperating with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, thereby leveraging the U.S. to counterbalance China and secure U.S. support in its territorial disputes with China.
Conclusion
Asia is profoundly affected by the influence of extraterritorial countries, particularly the U.S. China's efforts to establish an Asian security order require not only a reduction of U.S. interference but also recognition from other Asian countries, which will inevitably compare China's security views and practices to those of the U.S. This raises the standard for China's ability to construct a viable order. Leading the construction of an Asian security order through the Global Security Initiatives is both scientifically grounded and positively received by Asian nations, significantly surpassing the U.S. perspective rooted in a Cold War mentality. This approach represents a promising direction for the Asian security order. With confidence in its unique strategic characteristics, China should fully consider the realities of the region and the aspirations of Asian countries, learn from the experiences of others, and promote the implementation of the Global Security Initiative. Only in this way can China successfully construct a stable and effective Asian security order.
About the Author
Wang Junsheng 王俊生：Director and researcher of the China Periphery Strategy Research Office at the Asia Pacific and Global Strategy Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. His main research interests include security in Northeast Asia (with a focus on the Korean Peninsula) and the theory and practice of China’s diplomatic strategy. His related comments have appeared in the China Daily, Global Times, New York Times (USA), Chosun Ilbo (South Korea), as well as the Xinhua News Agency, TASS, Associated Press and other domestic and foreign media.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of the article was published by Northeast Asia Forum(《东北亚论坛》). The journal, managed by the Jilin University, is a comprehensive bimonthly periodical in politics, military, and law. Founded in 1992, the magazine focuses on analyzing the current situation, development strategies, economic cooperation, friendly exchanges and theoretical research in various countries and regions of Northeast Asia. It also evaluates new trends and developments in industry, agriculture, science and technology, finance, commerce, and foreign trade in the Asia Pacific region.
