WU Xinbo on China-U.S. Relations: The General Trend and Short Cycles
WU Xinbo on China-U.S. Relations: The General Trend and Short Cycles
For China, managing relations with the U.S. involves navigating both the general trend and leveraging opportunities in short cycles.
Welcome to the 3rd edition of our weekly newsletter! ChinAffairs+ is a weekly newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu. I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, and currently a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in the United States.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China's academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn
Summary
The article points out that the evolution of China-U.S. relations is shaped by the general trend（大趋势） but also affected by short cycles（小周期）. Since the second half of 2023, relations have entered a phase marked by increased dialogue, communication, and efforts to stabilize and ease tensions. The Biden administration has made slight adjustments to its China policy, placing greater emphasis on engagement and exchanges, adopting a more pragmatic approach to economic and trade matters, and focusing on cooperation, coexistence, and conflict prevention. Meanwhile, China has maintained a firm stance in response to U.S. containment efforts, while also working to influence and adapt U.S. policy based on changing conditions.
The summit between the U.S. and Chinese heads of state in San Francisco is crucial for advancing the management of objectives and processes in their bilateral relations. A key goal for this stage is to establish a stable, healthy, and sustainable China-U.S. relationship. Cooperation has returned to the bilateral agenda, alongside the management of disputes, which helps clarify the boundaries of competition between the two nations. The future trajectory of China-U.S. relations hinges on whether the U.S. can pragmatically define its China policy goals and establish reasonable limits for competition in the economic and trade sectors. In its approach to U.S. relations, China must base its strategy on overarching trends while capitalizing on short-term cycles.
Why It Matters
China-U.S. relations have long been a central focus in China's international politics academia and strategic community. As one of the most significant relationships of the 21st century, both China and the U.S. have placed great importance on managing this relationship and adjusting their strategic perceptions of each other in response to changing times. However, since the first Trump administration, the U.S. has labeled China as a strategic competitor, expanding competition to various fields, including global trade, regional influence, and especially high technology. With "out-competing China" becoming a bipartisan consensus, tensions between the two nations have escalated, raising risks in other areas.
Currently, China-U.S. relations are also influenced by the presidential race. While "China issues" have not been the main focus in recent candidate debates, both parties have highlighted China's significant impact on US domestic policy and foreign strategy. For example, Trump reiterated China’s effect on the U.S. economy, while Harris emphasized the competition with China in artificial intelligence.
However, it’s important to recognize that the policy debate between the two parties during the election cycle may distort public perception of the current state and future trajectory of China-U.S. relations. Some policies towards China during this period may serve not only long-term strategic goals but also domestic political agendas, making public judgment vulnerable to sudden events or candidate rhetoric. Understanding China-US relations without being swayed by the "election noise" is critical, and the "general trend, small cycles" framework discussed in the article offers valuable insights in this regard.
Key Points
The U.S. Policy toward China: Changes and Unchanged
Since the second half of 2023, China-U.S. relations have shown signs of stabilization, easing tensions, and improvement. While the U.S. has maintained its overall approach and policy framework towards China, it has made tactical adjustments, including increased engagement, a more flexible stance on bilateral economic and trade relations, and a focus on seeking limited cooperation alongside ongoing competition with China.
Unchanged in the General Trend-Restraining and Outcompeting China: Containment and competition remain the central tenets of U.S. policy toward China, representing a bipartisan consensus across both the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as a key priority for the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives on China-related issues. This approach is primarily reflected in the areas of technology and security:
Technology-Restricted Exports and Targetted Suppression: The U.S. has implemented suppression measures aimed at China’s semiconductor industry, requiring its allies to limit the sale of semiconductor equipment to China. Additionally, the U.S. has imposed bans or restrictions on American investors from investing in three key sectors: semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum technology, and artificial intelligence. Sanctions have also been placed on Chinese tech companies and research institutions.
Security and Diplomacy-Strengthening Regional Alliances: In terms of security and diplomacy, the Biden administration continues to apply pressure on China. Trilateral military cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and Australia—focused on countering China, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea—has been strengthened. The U.S. has conducted multiple military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region alongside its allies, while bolstering alliances through "mini-lateral" frameworks like U.S.-Japan-South Korea, AUKUS (U.S.-UK-Australia), and partnerships with the Philippines and India.
Changes in Short Cycles-Increasing Engagement and Pragmatic Approach: Following the China-U.S. presidential meeting in Bali in November 2022, despite disruptions like the "unmanned airship incident," the Biden administration made slight adjustments to its China policy. These adjustments have focused on enhancing engagement and fostering practical cooperation in key areas:
Increasing but Limited Engagement – Presidential Diplomacy and Sectoral Dialogues: In the first two years of Biden's presidency, influenced by the narrative of "failed engagement" with China, the U.S. maintained a relatively restrained approach to dialogue. However, after the Bali summit in late 2022, both countries began to increase dialogue in areas such as Asia-Pacific affairs, maritime security, arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation. This was accompanied by more active presidential diplomacy, along with increased U.S.-China communication in the military and security sectors. These engagements have played a positive role in managing competition, preventing conflict, and improving overall bilateral relations.
Pragmatic Approach and Practical Cooperation – ‘De-risking’ Rather than ‘Decoupling’: The U.S. has acknowledged the importance of its economic and trade ties with China and has shown a preference for maintaining significant trade and investment relations. Rather than pursuing "decoupling," the U.S. is focused on "de-risking" its economic relationship with China. This includes restricting exports in critical areas like semiconductors and artificial intelligence to prevent China from advancing in key technological and military domains. Additionally, the U.S. seeks to reduce its dependence on China in supply chains for essential materials and products to minimize vulnerabilities.
Adjustments in China Policy Focus: In the first two years of the Biden administration, U.S. policy centered on advancing strategic competition aimed at "out-competing" China. After the Bali meeting, however, this narrative shifted. The updated policy approach emphasizes:
A growing focus on the need for cooperation;
Advocating for coexistence amidst competition;
Prioritizing conflict prevention and crisis management.
China's Pushback against U.S. Provocations and Shaping of Bilateral Relations: China's approach to its policy with the U.S. remains resolute in the face of competition, focusing on both countering and influencing U.S. actions. On one hand, China firmly pushes back against U.S. efforts to contain and suppress its rise. On the other hand, China actively seeks to guide and encourage adjustments in U.S. policy, aiming to foster improvements in U.S.-China relations. This dual approach underscores China's commitment to defending its interests while shaping the trajectory of bilateral ties.
Firm Pushback and Active Responses-Countermeasures Against Targeted Suppressions and Public Opinion:
In response to U.S. actions that challenge China's core interests, particularly regarding the Taiwan question, China has implemented targeted countermeasures. These include placing certain U.S. companies on control lists, sanctioning anti-China organizations and individuals, and introducing export controls on critical materials like rare earth elements.
Facing persistent U.S. criticisms on human rights and democracy, China has responded by spotlighting the U.S.'s own domestic challenges, such as widening income inequality, human rights abuses, and its forceful approach to international relations. At multilateral forums like the United Nations, China has openly criticized U.S. hegemonic practices and biased diplomacy, positioning itself as a counterbalance to what it perceives as American dominance in global affairs.
Shape U.S. Policy toward China-Promoting Sustainable Communication and Practical Cooperation: China has actively worked to influence and guide U.S. policy in response to evolving circumstances, emphasizing the importance of maintaining stable channels for communication. Recognizing the "short cycles" of relative stability in U.S.-China relations, China capitalizes on these periods of détente to promote dialogue and stabilize bilateral relations.
Gradual Coordination of Strategic Goals: From a strategic standpoint, China and the U.S. have divergent visions for their bilateral relationship. China seeks to build ties rooted in mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and "win-win" cooperation, with an emphasis on shared success. In contrast, the U.S. prioritizes "out-competing China," aiming for a unilateral advantage rather than mutual benefit. Acknowledging these differing long-term objectives, China has put forward phased goals to guide the evolution of China-U.S. relations:
Avoiding conflict and confrontation;
Managing differences and expanding cooperation.
Dialectical View of the General Trend and Short Cycles: As 2024 approaches, marking a U.S. election year, the impact of domestic politics on U.S.-China relations is expected to grow. The interplay between long-term trends, shorter cycles, and U.S. domestic politics will collectively shape the future direction of bilateral relations, making it an important issue to monitor.
The General Trend: This trend is characterized by long-term, intense strategic competition. The U.S., driven by bipartisan consensus, continues to escalate its containment and suppression of China. In response, China remains steadfast in protecting its national sovereignty, security, and development interests.
The Short Cycles: In contrast, short cycles represent periods when the U.S. temporarily adjusts its stance towards China, driven by domestic and foreign policy considerations. During these times, there is a focus on coordination and cooperation on pressing issues. The interplay between these general trends and short cycles has been evident in the shifts observed in China-U.S. relations throughout 2023.
Unpredictable Changes in China-U.S. Relations
The Idea of Outcompeting China: If the U.S. remains focused on "outcompeting China," its policy is likely to lean heavily towards containment and suppression. This approach will likely exacerbate tensions and conflicts between the two countries, further destabilizing their relationship.
Unclear Definition and Boundaries of Competition: The U.S. has not clearly defined what "de-risking" entails or the boundaries of its competition with China. This ambiguity allows for excessive politicization and misinterpretation of national security concerns, leading to fluctuating and often strained China-U.S. relations.
Cycles of U.S. Domestic Politics: Domestic political dynamics in the U.S. also play a significant role in shaping China-U.S. relations. Extreme hawks may push for a "new Cold War," advocating for a strategy of economic "suppression plus decoupling"（打压加脱钩） and security "containment plus conflict"（遏制加冲突）. In contrast, more pragmatic hawks may support "suppression without decoupling" （打压不脱钩）and "deterrence without conflict" （威慑不冲突）aiming for a balanced approach that avoids outright conflict while still addressing strategic concerns.
Conclusion:
China-U.S. relations are shaped by both the general trend and short cycles. Currently, security remains the primary focus of the Biden administration’s policy towards China. With the U.S. entering an election year, domestic political factors are expected to further influence Biden's approach to China-related issues.
For China, managing relations with the U.S. involves navigating both the general trend and leveraging opportunities in short cycles. On one hand, China must prepare for the ongoing complexity of the China-U.S. rivalry and the potential intensification of U.S. containment efforts, while steadfastly protecting its sovereignty, security, and development interests. On the other hand, China should capitalize on periods of détente to foster constructive engagement, influence U.S. policy, address specific concerns, and mitigate risks in the bilateral relationship.
About the Author
WU Xinbo吴心伯: Dr. Wu is Professor and Dean, Institute of International Studies, and Director at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University. He teaches and researches China's foreign and security policy, Sino-U.S. relations, and U.S. Asia-Pacific policy. Prof. Wu is the author of Dollar Diplomacy and Major Powers in China,1909-1913(Fudan University Press,1997),Turbulent Water: US Asia-Pacific Security Strategy in the post-Cold War Era(Fudan University Press, 2006),Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States(United States Institute of Peace, 2008),The New Landscape in Sino-U.S. Relations in the early 21st Century(Fudan University Press,2011)and co-authored Asia-Pacific Regional Order in Transformation(Current Affairs Press, 2013),China and the Asia-Pacific Chess Game(Fudan University Press, 2017).
Dr. Wu serves on the policy advisory board of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Geopolitical Risk and served as its Vice-Chair (2012-13) and Chair (2013-14), and a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Geo-economics(2015-2016). He is currently a member on the Advisory Council of Asia Society Policy Institute, as well as a member of The Trilateral Commission.
Dr. WU entered Fudan University in 1982 as an undergraduate student and received his B.A. in history in 1986. In 1992, he got his Ph. D. in international relations from Fudan University. In the same year, he joined the Center for American Studies, Fudan University. In 1994, he spent one year at the George Washington University as a visiting scholar. In the fall of 1997, he was a visiting fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University and the Henry Stimson Center in Washington DC. From January to August, 2000, he was a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution. From September 2006 to July 2007, he was a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of this article was published in International Studies（《国际问题研究》）. The journal, which launched in May 1959 by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) affiliated with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is one of China's earliest academic journals focused on international affairs. Its creation was supported by key Chinese leaders, including Zhang Wentian, who advocated for a platform to publish research on global issues. The journal's title was personally inscribed by Vice Premier Chen Yi, reflecting the high-level attention it received.After initial publication, International Studies faced interruptions due to economic difficulties but was revived in 1981 as a quarterly and later as a bimonthly journal in 2000. With China's growing global influence, China International Studies was introduced in 2005 to offer international readers insights into China’s foreign policy. A comprehensive redesign in 2011 further elevated the journal's quality and expanded its influence worldwide.
The English version of this article was published in China International Studies, the English Version of International Studies.