ZHAO Long on China-Russia Strategic Coordination in the context of Great Changes
China-Russia relations are propelled by a tripartite motivation encompassing self-perception, shared understanding, and external pressures.
Welcome to the 6th edition of our weekly newsletter! In my recent article for China-US Focus, I explore the complexities of the China-U.S. relationship, challenging the notion that it has entered a “garbage time.” I argue that this characterization oversimplifies the ongoing strategic competition and overlooks the potential for meaningful engagement between the two nations. Through insights gained from discussions with scholars in Washington, I delve into the evolving debates surrounding U.S. policy toward China and highlight opportunities for cooperation in addressing shared challenges.
Please see the full article here: https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-us-relations-not-in-garbage-time
ChinAffairs+ is a weekly newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu. I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, and currently a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in the United States.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China's academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn
Summary
Enhancing strategic coordination through multilateral channels has become a pivotal means of highlighting the inclusive importance and global relevance of the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership in the new era. Faced with complex challenges such as security dilemmas from protracted regional conflicts, development dilemmas exacerbated by changing patterns of interaction, governance dilemmas due to a lack of mutual strategic trust, and order dilemmas shaped by evolving perceptions of national roles, China and Russia are driven by three key motivations: self-perception, shared understanding, and external pressures.
China and Russia are set to lead the development of the SCO and BRICS as key examples of enhanced strategic cooperation. For the SCO, this involves aligning its governance priorities and functional scope, ensuring representativeness and credibility while utilizing complementary strengths and fostering innovation. For BRICS, the focus is on improving adaptability and resilience, aligning diverse expectations, strengthening interest integration, and enhancing risk management, drawing on the "China-Russia experience" to guide joint efforts. Through this multilateral cooperation model, China and Russia aim to reform and improve the international order, advancing a fair and structured path toward a multipolar world.
Why It Matters
2024 marks the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Russia. At this new historical juncture, reinforcing permanent good-neighborliness, enhancing the resilience of mutually beneficial cooperation, and exploring inclusive values in comprehensive strategic collaboration have emerged as the shared vision for bilateral relations.
However, the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the strategic competition between China and the U.S. have led to new interpretations of the China-Russia relationship from the outside. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, many European countries and the United States believed that China's attitude could significantly influence Russia's foreign policy, considering China as a variable in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. During this unique period, cooperation between China and Russia has also been viewed as a form of indirect support from China to Russia for its military actions. In this context of security deficiency, external interpretations of the China-Russia relationship tend to overlook the differences and strategic considerations between the two countries, often viewing their cooperation as the formation of an "anti-Western camp". Consequently, they believe that China poses an increasingly significant security threat to Europe, and this concern has affected the relationships between China and Europe as well as between China and the U.S.
To address this, this news letter chooses to share an article that explores China-Russia strategic cooperation from a Chinese perspective, providing a "stakeholder" view for understanding their relationship. The article points out that while there have been some achievements in China-Russia strategic cooperation, there remain issues such as differences in the purposes of multilateral mechanism building, defects in mechanism design and implementation, and a tendency for political and ideological interpretations. Therefore, China and Russia should continue to clarify the multilateral nature of their cooperation, emphasizing inclusiveness, autonomy, and flexibility in strategic collaboration while enhancing their ability to respond to external pressures.
Key Points
Multiple Dilemmas in a Changing World: Regional Conflicts, Cooperation Challenges, Trust Deficits, and Confrontational Ideologies
In the context of regional conflicts, the strengthening of national security alliances and military capabilities has led to new security dilemmas: Since 2022, the Ukraine crisis and the new round of Israel-Palestine conflicts have continuously impacted regional security structures, with their effects spreading beyond borders. Countries lack consensus on how to break the political and battlefield deadlock, leading to panic-driven, reactive policy shifts. These shifts focus on strengthening alliance security concepts and military capabilities to address the global deficit of peace, such as the continuing expansion of NATO and the strengthen of the Russia-Belarus military alliance.
Conflicts have damaged cooperation and exchanges between countries, leading global multilateral mechanisms to shift towards a supply model that only welcomes 'like-minded' clubs：Major power competition is accelerating the 'friend-shoring' shift in global supply chains, prompting countries to create trade 'firewalls' and industrial 'buffer zones.' This shift indicates a move from a development logic to a security-focused paradigm. However, The emergence of a trade and technology system based on 'like-minded' nations is expanding national security boundaries, promoting the weaponization of financial, economic, and technological sectors, and forcing countries into a high-cost, competitive environment while adapting to inefficient trade structures.
Regional conflicts remain unresolved, leading to widespread skepticism towards the UN-centered collective security mechanism and setbacks in global disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation efforts：Following the Ukraine crisis and the latest Israel-Palestine conflict, affected countries have sought judicial relief through international courts. However, these institutions have lowered the standards for reviewing jurisdiction and substantive rights, fueling debates around the UN Charter, humanitarian intervention, and preventive self-defense. Moreover, there is an imbalance between traditional and non-traditional security issues, severely impacting topics like climate change, sustainable development, and strategic stability. What is worse, Global strategic stability and arms control processes are also showing signs of regression, leading to a blurring of nuclear use boundaries and prioritizing the development of strategic nuclear forces.
The pursuit of exclusive advantages or other exclusionary tendencies by certain countries has led others to take 'countermeasures', altering their perceptions of the trends in order evolution and their own roles: The current vulnerabilities exposed in the international order partly stem from some countries' pursuits of exclusive advantages in sovereignty, development, and security interests. These perceptions shape their strategic formations and policy practices, influencing the construction of international order.
The expansion of NATO security boundaries has heightened insecurity among countries outside the system, thereby changing their role perceptions and policy orientations. Confronting the collective consensus among the U.S. and Europe to counter, isolate, and contain Russia, Russia started to focus on anti-expansion, anti-containment, and anti-isolation objectives.
Driving Factors for the Deepening of China-Russia Multilateral Strategic Cooperation: The interaction and influence of the China-Russia relationship transcend bilateral structures and have a tradition of close communication and collaboration within multilateral frameworks. This article argues that the deepening of China-Russia multilateral strategic cooperation is driven by three factors: self-positioning, common perceptions, and external demands.
Self-perception as a Driving Factor: Historically, China and Russia have established the principle of lasting friendship and non-enmity through legal frameworks, adhering to important tenets of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and not targeting third parties. They are not committed to forming antagonistic military or political alliances. In their interactions, enhancing the inclusive value and global significance of China-Russia strategic cooperation through multilateral coordination has been a key consideration in shaping their bilateral relationship goals and visions.
Shared Understanding as a Driving Factor: In the Biden administration's National Security Strategy report, 'out-competing' China and 'restraining' Russia are highlighted as top global priorities. As two major powers on the Eurasian continent, China and Russia, despite differing approaches to expressing security concerns and safeguarding interests, share an increasingly resonant strategic perception in the face of geopolitical pressures and containment. This shared perception has become a significant driver for deepening their strategic cooperation. In addition to their mutual understanding of regional dynamics, both nations share a common aspiration for promoting global multipolarity.
External Pressures as a Driving Factor: In the face of the broad securitization of international cooperation, the politicization of multilateral platforms, and the ideologically driven 'democracy versus authoritarianism' narrative, the Global South and developing countries have high expectations for China and Russia to play a leading role. They seek collective action to address issues like the energy and food crises, aiming to bring development topics back to the forefront of multilateral interactions, which leads them to join non-Western-led institutional arrangements such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS.
Deepening the Multilateral Path and Agenda for China-Russia Strategic Cooperation: Engaging in close communication and strategic collaboration within multilateral frameworks is essential for China and Russia in the new era. Their joint leadership in the establishment, development, and strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS serves as a significant model. In light of new changes, the SCO and BRICS mechanisms represent the best practices for China and Russia to deepen their strategic cooperation through multilateral pathways.
SCO—Coordinating Governance Focus and Functional Boundaries:
Shared security challenges are a key impetus for security cooperation within the organization, while member states' common aspirations for stability and development serve as a driving force, with China and Russia at the forefront of enhancing security collaboration. For China and Russia, improving the SCO's representativeness and governance capacity through effective mechanisms can be approached in three key areas.
First, clarifying governance focus and functional boundaries is essential to building a collective identity while diminishing bloc mentality：To foster a collective identity within the SCO, China and Russia should guide member states to move beyond the notion of 'competing with the West,' emphasizing that their development momentum is not rooted in alliance logic or confrontation. Their shared vision should focus not on vying for regional dominance, but on addressing the security, development, and governance challenges faced by member states, the region, and the world.
Second, balancing the mechanism's representativeness and authority while orderly expanding membership is crucial for enhancing governance effectiveness：The SCO has evolved into a comprehensive platform for political, security, economic, and cultural cooperation, yet it struggles to address conflicts among member states and improve the membership acceptance process.
China and Russia can strengthen policy coordination in Central Asia, recognized as the SCO's 'core area', to ensure that the 'dual-core' driving model accommodates multi-layered interactions， preventing traditional conflicts and deep-seated differences between new and existing members from undermining the organization's internal cohesion. Additionally, China and Russia should emphasize sustainability and retrospective evaluation metrics, ensuring effective multi-track coordination with regional and global mechanisms.
Third, tapping into complementary advantages and innovative potential is essential for enhancing appeal while avoiding a loss of focus in cooperation: Some countries wishing to join the SCO may adopt an overly pragmatic mindset, seeking political, economic, and security gains, or viewing membership merely as a means to counter U.S. influence. Such misunderstandings among member states could dilute the SCO's core values. Under this situation, China and Russia need to uphold principles of non-alignment, openness, and respect for sovereignty while rejecting interference in internal affairs, thereby reinforcing the SCO's appeal to regional countries. Additionally, they should implement appropriate action programs and subsidiary arrangements to address common challenges faced by member states, such as weak overall demand, diminished cooperative momentum, and disruptions in supply chains.
BRICS—Enhancing Interest Integration and Action Coordination: The year 2024 marks the beginning of a new phase following BRICS' historic expansion, with Russia, as the rotating chair, hosting multiple events, including the first meeting of the leaders of the "BRICS Ten. In this context, China and Russia can leverage constructive synergy in guiding concepts, interaction norms, core agendas, and development visions, ensuring risk identification and strategic alignment of political and economic agendas.
First, enhancing environmental adaptability and cooperation resilience is crucial to better address the spillover effects of the negative impacts from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the misinformation campaigns from other countries. Simultaneously, sanctions and counter-sanctions among the U.S., Russia, and Europe put pressure on BRICS nations' cooperation in areas like food, energy, and finance, necessitating adjustments in the next phase. Therefore, China and Russia should try to align positions on key issues and enhance multilateral cooperation mechanisms for more coordinated actions within BRICS.
Second, coordinating diverse demands and strengthening interest integration is essential. Russia views BRICS as a platform to counter Western sanctions, India uses it to balance Indo-Pacific and Eurasia interests, South Africa seeks to enhance Africa's influence, and Brazil aims for increased cooperation opportunities. The challenge lies in achieving breakthroughs in practical cooperation beyond political consensus, particularly through the development of institutional and functional platforms like the New Development Bank, which will be a key focus for China and Russia in leading BRICS cooperation.
Third, leveraging "China-Russia experience" to explore new cooperation pilots. With the increasing amount of cross-border transactions in renminbi, local currency cooperation and the establishment of payment systems are vital directions for expanding practical collaboration within BRICS. Currently, 5% of bilateral trade between China and Russia is settled in local currencies. They can promote their experiences in cross-border settlements and payments within the BRICS framework, using the "BRICS+" platform to expand local currency settlements in trade involving energy, minerals, and agricultural products.
Fourth, enhance risk identification and resilience capabilities.
Structural risks from regional conflicts and great power competition disrupt global supply chains, while technological risks hinder trade within BRICS. Chinese enterprises must navigate demands from various markets to avoid "secondary sanctions." To address these challenges, China and Russia should enhance BRICS' internal decision-making and foster multi-tiered cooperation with partner, contact, and observer countries, clarifying contributions and needs in political security, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange to establish a long-term development vision for BRICS.
Conclusion
China and Russia, as major neighboring countries, share a unique geopolitical environment and complementary development advantages. This not only drives their bilateral relationship but also serves as a foundation for deepening strategic trust and coordination through multilateral frameworks, positioning them as leaders within organizations like the SCO and BRICS.
However, it is essential to avoid the perception of "China-Russia leadership" becoming "China-Russia dominance" and to prevent the non-Western institutional attempts from being seen as anti-Western. Addressing imbalances in governance and mitigating politicization will enhance risk resilience and inclusivity in China-Russia collaboration, strengthening the inclusiveness, autonomy, and flexibility of their strategic collaboration, highlighting the global significance of their partnership.
About the Author
ZHAO Long赵隆: He is Deputy Director of the Institute for Global Governance Studies and Senior Research Fellow (Professor) at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. Dr. ZHAO has published several academic papers on Global governance, International Law, Arctic issue, Russian and Central Asian studies in major academic journals, which are listed on the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI), he has also published many articles in major newspapers such as People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, and Jiefang Daily. He is a leader of research projects supported by the National Social Science Foundation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Oceanic Administration of China, and others.
He was a visiting scholar of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. He has been invited to participate in major international forums and conferences hosted in Europe, Russian and other places. From 2015 to 2016, Dr. ZHAO was on secondment to the Department of Treaty and Law at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of the article was published by Russian Studies（《俄罗斯研究》），formerly known as Today's Eastern Europe and Central Asia《今日东欧中亚》，is a bimonthly academic publication. It is supervised by the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China and edited and published by the Center for Russian Studies at East China Normal University (a key research base for humanities and social sciences under the Ministry of Education). The journal has been recognized as a dual-effect journal by the Chinese Journal Matrix and is included in the core journals of Chinese humanities and social sciences, as well as the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI). Its readership includes experts and scholars researching political and economic issues in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, as well as decision-making departments, foreign trade enterprises, foreign affairs personnel, faculty and students in higher education institutions, and researchers in academic institutions.
